This paper analyses the role played by competitive pressure (increasing imports) and the restructuring of industries through entry and exit in productivity growth of Spanish manufacturing during the eighties, the key period of its involvement in the EEC economy. A GMM panel estimation of the determinants of corrected Solow residual for a disaggregation of manufacturing in 75 industries, observed during the years 1979-1990, shows that these forces accounted in total for 80% of productivity growth, with an important role in the displacement of inefficient firms by competitive entry. JEL Classification: D24, C33.
Introduction
This paper studies the role played by competitive pressure (increasing imports) and the restructuring of industries through entry and exit in productivity growth of Spanish manufacturing during the eighties. During this period, Spanish manufacturing suffered from intense competitive pressure (before, during and after the 1986 EEC integration) derived from a continuous increase of the penetration of imports while markets opened at an extraordinary pace, and underwent an extensive restructuring related to a high rate of firm turnover (with high entry and exit). Manufacturing productivity increased at high rates, and the impact of the opening and restructuring of the markets is a relevant question that has not been previously investigated 1 .
The basic facts are as follows. Firstly, manufacturing productivity increase was aligned with the highest rates experienced by manufacturing in industrial countries. Table 1 documents this fact with comparable TFP calculations performed with aggregated data. Secondly, markets of manufactured goods opened at an extraordinary pace. The share of imports in domestic demand (import penetration) almost doubled, and the fraction of production that domestic firms sold abroad (export intensity) also increased sharply (see the Data Appendix   table) . Thirdly, manufacturing industries experienced high gross rates of entry and exit, with a high displacement component (replacement of low productivity firms by more efficient firms). Table 1 shows, despite the difficulties in finding fully comparable figures, Spanish entry and exit rates were relatively high and, at the same time, unbalanced (the total number of firms 1 Our subject is closely related to the question of the effects of increased competitive pressure on productivity growth. See Caves and Barton (1990) and Vives (1993) for surveys on the subject. Siotis (2003) has recently examined the symmetric question of the effects of the competitive pressure during 1983-96 on the firm's margins.
was reduced by about 25% from the beginning of the period until the moment at which entry and exit redress). Table 2 provides strong evidence of displacement. While entry and exit are found everywhere to be positively correlated across industries (see, for example, Geroski (1995) or Caves (1998) ), entry and exit controlling for fixed effects (the industry averages over time of entry and exit) are expected to be negatively correlated under the usual hypothesis of shared expectations (what makes entry higher than average must also make exit lower, and conversely) 2 . Entry and exit in Spanish manufacturing during the eighties turn out to be, on the contrary, positively related, even controlling for fixed effects. In addition, when computed, almost 3/4 of intraindustry correlation coefficients give a positive relationship.
To assess the sources of productivity growth, we measure productivity increases at the industry level for 75 of the 81 industries in which manufacturing is disaggregated by the yearly Spanish industrial survey (Encuesta Industrial) of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).
We use the Solow residual controlled for the effects of market power, non-constant returns, and varying utilisation, and we decompose it according to the role played by a number of explanatory variables in a GMM panel data regression. 3 Previously, we show how an industry Solow residual consists of two parts: a weighted average of firm-level productivity growth, and the effect derived from output reallocation among firms, and we discuss how entry and exit rates are likely to impact the second term of this decomposition and the way to identify displacement effects.
There has been an increasing interest in the impact of turnover on productivity growth (for an overview see Tybout (1996) , and also Caves (1998)). Theoretical works on industry dynamics provide models in which firms' entry and exit decisions are interrelated with their differentials in productivity, and hence they matter for productivity growth 4 . An increasing number of empirical papers have examined in different contexts the role played by turnover in productivity growth 5 . However, these works share the use of firm-level data. In this paper, we argue that identification of the basic effects is possible using regression methods and information on the industries' entry and exit rates. In addition, the relationship to be expected between entry and exit is largely undetermined 6 . We have already pointed out the evidence in favour of strong displacement effects in our sample. Our exercise sets a simple but useful framework to distinguish and identify these effects.
Results give a clear picture of the evolution of Spanish manufacturing efficiency during the eighties. Productivity growth was strongly linked to competitive pressure and the restructuring of industries through two channels: incumbent firms sharply increased efficiency to survive, and the replacement of less efficient firms by new entrants also greatly increased efficiency. The role of displacement is confirmed: exits were closely linked to the emergence of new, more efficient competitors in the marketplace. The exhaustion of this extraordinary context by the middle of the 90's may partially explain the productivity growth slowdown that seems to have followed this period.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the framework for productivity growth measurement. Section 3 discusses the firm-level determinants, and Section 4 4 the relationship of industry-level productivity growth with the entry and exit rates. Section 5 explains the econometric specification and results and Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. A Data Appendix documents the data and variables used, and three technical appendices explain details on the measurement of industry composition effects on productivity, the identification of entry and exit effects and possible relationships between entry and exit.
Framewo rk of measurement.
Our aim is the measurement of productivity growth effects stemming from two sources:
the increases in the efficiency of the firms that form the industry, given their shares, and the changes in the allocation of the industry output among firms with different efficiency levels. We proceed as follows. Firstly, we compute the conventional Solow residual S jt θ for every industry j and year t. Secondly, we regress these residuals on the necessary corrections to obtain as a remaining factor the "true" increases of productivity and then we split them into the parts explained by the "firm efficiency" and "composition" factors. Let us explain the details.
An industry Solow residual can be computed using the log-differences of output (y), labour (l), capital (k) and materials (m), provided that the unobservable elasticities ε L , ε K and ε M are approximated. Traditional productivity analysis replaced them by income shares under the assumption that technology is linearly homogeneous and firms are in a long-run competitive equilibrium. This can still be used, provided that one simultaneously employs the corrections for the presence of market power and non-constant returns to scale developed by Hall (1988 Hall ( , 1990 ). Let µ be the ratio price/marginal cost, ω L and ω M the income shares of labour and materials, and ã the returns to scale parameter. We will regress the Solow residuals on the
in order to correct for market power, and we will include a term in the form k 1) -(γ to estimate the effect of non-constant returns to scale. In addition, we will use a measure v jt of the degree of capacity utilisation to deal with the effects of a varying utilization of quasifixed inputs. 7 All this will leave a remaining "true" productivity growth jt θ unexplained.
The determinants of jt θ can be analysed by specifying these values as a mix of systematic and stochastic components. In particular, industry "true" residuals can be split up into two additive terms reflecting the two sources of productivity growth.
Assume that the typical industry consists of N firms that show different degrees of efficiency, specified by idiosyncratic terms that multiply a common basic technology represented by the production function f(.) that, for the moment, we will assume is linearly
for the firm i, where q i represents output, x i is a vector of K inputs, and a i gives the (approximate) proportional difference in efficiency of firm i with respect to the benchmark firm (a i =0), or its (exact) proportional advantage on unit or marginal costs. Aggregating across firms, we obtain the production relationship
, where q and x stand for the aggregated output and vector of inputs, respectively, s i =q i /q represents the market share of firm i, and )
aggregate efficiency index (see Appendix A). Given this, industry productivity growth measured by the industry Solow residual can be written as 7 See, however, Delgado, Jaumandreu and Martín (1999) for a more structural approach to the problem. 8 The effects of the absence of linear homogeneity here are likely to be of second order (Appendix A).
The first term of the last equality in (1) 
where
and u jt is a zero mean uncorrelated disturbance that includes ξ jt as a component.
Equation (2) must be seen as an accounting relationship, fully consistent with different firms' behaviour across industries and varying patterns of entry and exit. Productivity growth (and profitability) as well as the determinants we are going to detail in the following sections (R&D activities, imports, entry and exit) must, of course, be taken as jointly determined in long-run equilibrium for each industry, with values that depend on the specific game firms play.
However, the estimation of (2) as a separate relationship is useful and legitimate due to two features. Firstly, the specification is flexible enough to accommodate individual differences; for instance, it allows for time-persistent heterogeneity in productivity growth across industries, which our estimation method allows for to be freely correlated with the explanatory variables.
Secondly, explanatory variables can be assumed to be determined in advance of the dependent variable (predetermined) and hence the estimation procedure is robust to endogeneity.
Firm-level productivity growth determinants
Let us specify the factors that are likely to generate productivity increases at the firm level:
innovative activities, demand and competitive pressure exerted by imports 9 .
Productivity growth is related to knowledge capital increases (Griliches (1995) ). We use two indicators adding up total technological effort: the R&D expenditures/value-added and technological-payments/value-added ratios (RDVA and TPVA). But some productivityenhancing innovations come embodied in new machinery (OECD (1996)). As a (rough) indicator, we use the variation in the ratio stock of capital/number of workers (II) 10 . High demand states are likely to encourage innovations, reorganisations of the work processes, and greater effort. We assume that these effects depend on the pace of growth of firms' demand measured by a weighted sum of the growth rates of buyers' demand (DEM) 11 . 9 These are the basic firms' productivity growth sources considered in Geroski (1989) , Caves and Barton (1990) and Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall (1992) . Harrison (1994) focuses on a trade reform. 10 In using this variable we follow Caves and Barton (1990) . Of course this ratio also enters t he productivity growth computations, but with a constrained coefficient. 11 This demand variable avoids the endogeneity problems presented by the output growth measures.
The most important environmental factor is competitive pressure derived from foreign competition and we include the ratio imports/domestic-demand (IMP). A low degree of competition is likely to sustain productive inefficiencies in different ways 12 : X-inefficiencies, lower information flows making efficiency more difficult; enhanced market power favouring socially inefficient decisions. Weak competition may be the result of a low degree of foreign interaction in markets (tariffs and other restrictions on trade create such a situation.) Moves toward free trade are then expected to have an effect on profitability (well documented) and efficiency (less studied). 
Entry, exit, and productivity growth.
Let us establish the relationships between productivity growth and gross entry and exit rates (GENR and GEXR). On the one hand, productivity growth is expected to be positively related to both rates, with a direct effect derived from productivity change associated with the simple addition or subtraction of firms with differing productivity, and an indirect effect derived from sharpened competition, with a lower impact in the case of the exit rate due to its additional market concentration effect. On the other hand, if displacement effects are important, entry and exit rates provide the same information and their effects are expected to melt. Let us briefly detail these two insights in turn.
Entrant firms are supposed to have some productivity advantages, or at least gain them after some market experience, and surviving entrants expand their shares during their first years of life. Exiting firms are supposed to suffer productivity disadvantages, and their shares 12 See Caves and Barton (1990) and Vives (1993) . 13 Caves and Barton (1990) find an efficiency effect of imports and productivity growth effects of lagged fade away 14 . Entry and exit are also likely to induce changes in other shares. If all the firms (entrant, continuing and exiting firms) were of an identical and invariable size, changes in shares following entry and exit would be proportional to the entry and exit rates. But firms' sizes differ and they must be considered endogenously determined according to the condition of competition that entry and exit contribute to create. Models of imperfect competition, however, invariably relate output advantages to cost advantages and to the toughness of competition. This can be used to obtain the definite impact. Appendix B shows that productivity growth is expected to be positively related to both rates, with a direct productivity effect, and an indirect effect derived from sharpened competition, with a lower impact of exit because of market concentration. Now, let us discuss the relationship between the rates of entry and exit. It is customary to distinguish at least two different sources of entry and exit (see Geroski (1995) ). One source is market enlargements or contractions, with origin in demand or cost changes. Market enlargements would allow the entry of new firms, and market contractions would induce the exit of redundant firms 15 . The other source is the competitive process, with the replacement of firms already established in the industry by new entrants, typically because the latter enter the market with superior technologies. Entry of this type is said to have a displacement effect.
Appendix C formalises these concepts in the simplified context of a market with two types of firms, where a fixed cost, given competition, raises a frontier of possibilities of firm numbers. 16 Competitive entry displaces the less efficient firms along the frontier. Market enlargements or imports. Harrison (1994) also finds growth effects of the reform. Tybout (1996) quotes other examples. 14 Entrant firms can also be less productive than the average but more productive than exiting firms. 15 One source of market contractions may be the increase of imports of equivalent products. 16 We also derive, as an example, the frontier when demand is linear and firms compete à la Cournot.
contractions are determined by corresponding frontier movements. Panels A and B of Figure 1 depict the mix of effects for two supposedly observed changes of firm numbers in the industry.
These two types of entry and exit raise the possibility of very different relationships between industry entry and exit rates over time. Call t α the displacing entry rate at time t, λ the rate of displacement, and d t the (absolute value) rate of change in the number of firms induced by demand. Then, entry and exit rates will be generated over time according to the
where 1(.) stands for the indicator function. If demand effects dominate, entry and exit rates will be negatively correlated. If competitive entry dominates, entry and exit rates will be strongly positively correlated over time (both rates refer to a basic common fact and this raises a problem of colinearity among variables.) we always estimate differencing out these effects by using the first differences' transformation of the equation. We also include a set of time dummies, and we instrument the variable which accounts for market power with cross-section lagged values at t-2 and t-3, in the framework of the general method of moments (see Arellano and Bond (1991) 17 The coefficients corresponding to the industries with increasing and constant returns to scale are in general not significantly different from zero, and hence the restriction that they are equal to unity may be accepted at the 5% level. However, all the return parameters cannot be constrained to have a value of one (estimate 2). The indicator of the degree of utilisation, when included, is not significant (estimate 3). This probably suggests that the demand indicator is enough to pick up changes induced by fluctuations in utilisation.
Econometric estimation and results.
Estimation reveals the following. Firstly, R&D expenditures have a positive and significant impact with a lag, though it is impossible to find a significant impact of technological payments.
This suggests an asymmetric impact on productivity during the period of the innovative activities carried out inside the walls, with respect to the acquisition of licenses of available technologies. On the contrary, investment intensity tends to show a positive and significant 17 Sectors' grouping is based on the cost function estimates in Velázquez (1993) .
contemporaneous impact on productivity, which seems to confirm the role of embodied innovations.
Secondly, import penetration attracts a strong and significant positive coefficient when included in the equation with a lag 18 . We interpret this effect as the increase in firms' productivity induced by competitive pressure, as explained in section 3.
Finally, gross entry and exit rates are positive and significant determinants of productivity when included separately (estimates 1 to 3 and 4, respectively). In addition, the coefficient attracted by the exit rates is lower. In any case, the effects tend to decrease and be imprecisely estimated when both rates are included simultaneously (estimate 5). These estimates are fully consistent with the theoretical insights developed in section 4. They point out that turnover was an important determinant of productivity growth and that entry and exit rates are at the origin of the same productivity gains, confirming both the presence and importance of displacement. 19, 20 It seems natural to define the expression
, where k x is the sample mean of the k-th variable and k β its estimated coefficient, as an estimate of the systematic component of productivity growth 21 . This estimate can be used to evaluate the role 18 Export intensity was also tried and did not show any additional effect. 19 20 Structural change tests of the imports and entry impact have been performed by allowing a different coefficient in the post-entry subperiod (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . A change in the impact of imports is clearly rejected, but the test on turnover suggests that its role was somewhat more important before 1986. 21 It also seems natural to define θ including a constant 0 β , whose value cannot be estimated separately from j θ and t θ except under the assumption 0
. In practice we operate as if there were a of each determinant. The bottom right part of Table 3 presents the decomposition of productivity growth. This decomposition gives a nice picture of the sources of the productivity increase in the Spanish manufacturing sector during the eighties. There is an extremely important i nfluence of the pressure derived from imports on productivity growth (50% of the average productivity growth), but another important source is the structural change in industries derived from entry and exit (30%), while the contribution of R&D emerges as the other important determinant (13%).
Equation (2) can also be used to assess the role of the corrections to the conventionally computed Solow residual and hence to evaluate the true overall productivity growth. The top right part of Table 3 summarises the results of this decomposition. The average of the conventionally computed Solow residual (our dependent variable) is 0.97%. Average corrected productivity growth is evaluated at 1.58% per year. Therefore, the conventional Solow residual is, in this case, a downward biased approximation of the true productivity growth.
Conclusion
This paper examines productivity growth in a sample of 75 Spanish manufacturers during the eighties, the period in which Spanish manufacturing was under intense competitive pressure derived from the EEC integration and showed an extensive structural change, reflected mostly in high and unbalanced gross rates of firm entry and exit. 
Data Appendix
The sample consists of 75 of the 81 industries in which manufacturing is disaggregated by the yearly Spanish industrial survey (Encuesta Industrial) of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). There are no entry and exit data for the other six industries. The variables v, RDVA and TPVA are available only for a lower level of disaggregation of manufacturing. Variable sample means are reported in the Data Appendix Table. Productivity growth ( S θ ): computed using a Tornqvist index using the log differences (%) of real gross product, total hours of work, real capital stock and real consumption of materials. Shares are computed as the average shares of labour costs and material expenditures in gross production between years t and t-1. Capital stock (K): Computed recursively starting from an initial estimation based on official engineering estimates of capital-product ratios at the time, and referring its value to 1980 prices. Price-cost margin (PCM): Calculated as (gross production-labour costs-subsidies-cost of materials) over total sales. ≈ and differencing, we obtain expression (1). Now let f(x i ) be homogeneous of is easily obtained, where the â's depend on three effects of the entry and exit rates: "direct," "competition" and "concentration." The effect of entry is always expected to be positive, and the coefficient of the exit rate will be positive if the direct and competition effects of exit prevail over the concentration effects (as we can expect).
Appendix C: A case of the frontier of possibilities of firm numbers.
Assume the same two firms' setting of Appendix B. Suppose in addition that operation in the industry implies some fixed cost or minimum profits. Then, given demand, cost conditions and conduct, there will be a maximum number of firms of type 2 that will be able to operate with non-negative profits for each number of type 1 firms. This defines a frontier of possibilities of firm numbers in the market (see Figure 1) . Entry with displacement effects refers to the entry and exit associated with movements along this frontier. The rate dN 2 /dN 1 reports the number of type 2 firms that will be replaced by a firm of type 1. Entry and exit by market enlargements or contractions refer to the entry and exit associated with movements of the frontier. As an example, assume that N 1 type 1 firms and N 2 type 2 firms compete à la Cournot with constant marginal costs 1 c and 2 c . The inverse market demand function is p=d-bQ, with Q=N 1 q 1 +N 2 q 2 . Assuming a fixed cost F, profits of a type 2 firm can be written as
. Equating this expression to zero, we obtain the equation of the frontier Notes:
1 GMM instruments for the MWR variable (see the text). 2 All the estimates include time dummies. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 3 Coefficient estimate for the variable GENR multiplied by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the year belongs to the period 1987-1990 and the value 0 elsewhere. 4 Estimates based on parameter estimates in (1). 5 Test of overidentifying restrictions. m 1 and m 2 are statistics of first and second order serial correlation. Variable Statistics (sample means) 
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DATA APPENDIX TABLE
